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The nature of loyalism in the American Revolution is an intractable histor-
ical problem, in part, because the Loyalists appeared in several distinct social 
and political settings: pre-Revolutionary colonial society, rebellious American 
states, the various parts of the British Empire to which they fled, and the post-
Revolutionary republic where still more re-emerged as respectable citizens. 
In each of these contexts the Loyalists revealed different facets of the values, 
attitudes, and characteristics which accounted for their adherence to the 
Crown. While it is dangerous to read back into the Loyalists' Revolutionary 
experience things they said in retrospect, it is also misleading to assume that 
the Loyalists revealed everything they had to say about themselves under the 
intense pressures of specific crises in the pre-Revolutionary controversy or 
later during the Revolution itself. 
While a perceptive kind of comparative history will be needed to bring to-
gether the pieces of the Loyalist puzzle, it is also important to explore as 
analytically as possible the Loyalists' perception of reality, the structure of 
their values, and the pattern of their rational and emotional responses within 
each of the historical contexts from which they operated. Historians dealing 
with the Loyalists have, for the most part, asked questions about the location 
and condition of identifiable groups of Loyalists, the thrust of Loyalist rebuttals 
to specific tenets of Whig belief, and the political and social conditions which 
made some colonists unusually dependent on British authority for their secur-
ity and identity. Another kind of question should probe the Loyalists' view of 
themselves and focus on their own statements of self-consciousness and self-
awareness. Pre-Revolutionary critics and victims of colonial resistance felt 
conscious of certain political and social roles which they tried to play as the 
imperial controversy progressed; they wrestled with the dilemma of adapting, 
improving, relaxing, or intensifying their performance of those roles as the 
pre-Revolutionary movement made those roles increasingly awkward; as each 
individual realized that he was not going to regain his former authority, in-
fluence, or equanimity, he communed within himself and gave some expression 
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to the anguish he felt. The Loyalists' understanding and presentation of their 
roles, dilemmas, and anguish in letters, pamphlets, oratory, state papers, and 
in the way they dealt with public issues and devised strategies for defending 
themselves revealed a coherent view of external events and their own charac-
ter in time of crisis. 
A useful tool in the examination of this kind of Loyalist testimony is the 
concept of perception, the process of giving structure to thought and sensa-
tions. Perception seeks explanations and patterns in the random data which 
the senses detect in a social situation; it uses language "to determine or at 
least to influence what one notices around him"; it is a process which creates 
categories and "category-systems" in the mind. Perception deals with a man's 
self-image, emotional and intellectual dexterity and stamina, the imperatives 
which govern his conduct in times of crisis and the predispositions which 
operate in periods of routine. By treating pre-Revolutionary opponents of 
colonial resistance as verbalizing, category building, reflective, self-conscious 
figures, one can gain access to the interior of their political thought.1 As the 
pre-Revolutionary critics and opponents of colonial resistance responded to 
the crises of that period, they constructed three reasonably distinct models 
of political reality. One was the enunciation of principle, the repeated state-
ment of legal, historical, and constitutional rules which bound the Empire 
together and necessarily circumscribed colonial liberty. A second was the 
search for accommodation, the belief that grounds for compromise existed 
and could be discovered and exploited through the use of good sense and 
prudence. A third was the appeal to doctrine, the sometimes shrill, uncom-
promising insistence that all colonial resistance and remonstrance was morally 
wrong and aesthetically abhorent. 
Thomas Hutchinson was, of course, the pre-eminent Loyalist enunciator of 
principle, combining a sure grasp of fundamentals with a sensitivity for intri-
cacies. "I have but one set of principles upon government ir general and the 
constitution of this province in particular. There must be one supreme legis-
lature in every state." He admitted, however, that "it is a very difficult matter 
1 This paragraph is based on a variety of writings in social psychology and phenomenology. 
Jerome S. Bruner, "Social Psychology and Perception',' in E. E. Maccoby et ai, eds., Readings in 
Social Psychology (New York, 1958), pp. 85-94 and Roger Brown, Social Psychology (New York, 
1965), chapter 12 both discuss the major recent writings in the field and quotations are from the 
Bruner article. See also Frank P. Chambers, Perception, Understanding, and Society (London, 
1961), p. 51; Maurice Merleau-Ponty, The Primacy of Perception (Evanston, 111., 1964), p. 25; 
Zevedi Barbu, Problems in Historical Psychology (New York, 1960), pp. 20-22; the extensive dis-
cussion of work on motivation in Robert F. Berkhofer,/! Behavior Approach to Historical Analysis 
(New York, 1969), pp. 55-67. This scholarship meshes closely with several recent historiographical 
articles: Samuel H. Beer, "Casual Explanation and Imaginative Re-enactment',' and Bruce Kuklick, 
'The Mind of the Historian',' both in History and Theory, III (1963), pp. 6-29 and VIII (1969), 
pp. 313-331, and John Dunn, "The Identity of the History of Ideas',' Philosophy, XLIII (April, 
1968), pp. 85-104. 
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to determine any certain proportion of freedom necessary to the happiness 
of a subordinate state!'2 He devoted a lifetime to the search for that "certain 
proportion of freedom" and we know a great deal about the depth and nature 
of that commitment from Edmund S. Morgan's analysis of Hutchinson in the 
Stamp Act crisis, Malcolm Freiberg's dissection of his ambition and his self-
doubts, Clifford K. Shipton's defense of his rectitude, and Bailyn's discovery 
of his constitutional acumen? What this fragmented, somewhat static, portrait 
lacks is an appreciation of Hutchinson's emotionality — the passions which 
integrated his roles and aspirations and aggravated his suffering. One way 
to fill this void is to focus, not only on his manifest principles, ambitions, and 
skills, but also on the strange paradoxes and polarities of his political char-
ac te r 
The strongest of those polarities was his belief that he was primarily a de-
fender of colonial liberty and that prudent submission to British authority was 
a subtle strategy for preserving that liberty. As Professor Morgan showed in 
1948, Hutchinson privately came close to denying the legitimacy of the entire 
Grenville program and stated categorically that it did infringe on inherent 
colonial rights; yet in 1770 he privately proposed a horrifying set of coercive 
measures for Britain to impose on Massachusetts. Hutchinson was never con-
scious of any contradiction. The coercion he sadly recommended was intend-
ed to have a stunning, sobering effect on the shortsighted and excited men 
and inaugurate a stabilizing period and thereby strengthen Massachusetts' 
capacity to resist British encroachments.5 Hutchinson's tremendous personal 
reserve created the very suspicions which kept his political life in upheaval; 
against his aloofness, however, tugged his ambition to provide decisive public 
leadership. He candidly spoke of this tension in his character during his dis-
pute with the General Court over the Boston Resolves in 1773: 
2 Hutchinson to Rev. Eli Forbes, 16 October 1773, and to John Hely Hutchinson, 14 February 
1772, Hutchinson Letterbooks, XXVII, pp. 556-57,296-300, Massachusetts Archives, State House, 
Boston (available in typescript at the Massachusetts Historical Society, Boston). 
3 Morgan, "Thomas Hutchinson and the Stamp Act',' New England Quarterly, XXI (1942), pp. 
459-492; Freiberg, "How to Become a Colonial Governor" Review of Politics, XXI (October, 
1951), pp. 646-656; Shipton, Sibley's Harvard Graduates (Cambridge and Boston, 1933- ), VII, 
pp. 383-413; B. Bailyn, Ideological Origins of the American Revolution (Cambridge, Mass., 1967), 
pp. 121-123. 
4 This statement is made prior to seeing Professor Bailyn's forthcoming study of Hutchinson, 
which may well deal with him as a man of passion as well as cold realism. Bailyn's comments in 
John A. Garraty, ed., Interpretating American History: Conversations with Historians (New York, 
1970), I, p. 74 treat him as kind of constant in eighteenth-century political orthodoxy against which 
novel pre-Revolutionary ideas and practices can be measured. 
5 Morgan, "Thomas Hutchinson and the Stamp Act',' pp. 487-492; Donald C. Lord and Robert 
M. Calhoon, "The Removal of the Massachusetts General Court from Boston, 1769-1772',' Journal 
of American History, LV (1969), p. 728, n. 9. 
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If I am wrong in my principles of government or in the inferences I have 
drawn from them, I wish to be convinced of my error. I have laid before 
you the principles of your constitution. If you do not agree with me I wish 
to know your objections. They may be convincing to me or I may be able 
to satisfy you of the insufficiency of them. In either case, I hope, we shall 
be able to put an end to those irregularities which shall ever be the portion 
of a government where the supreme authority is controverted.6 
In 1773, that was exactly the kind of dialogue Hutchinson sought to have with 
his contemporaries — a healing exchange in which he prescribed the premises 
of the discussion. He could emerge just that far, but no farther, from his pri-
vate contemplation of the issues of liberty and authority. 
Hutchinson struggled intelligently with these conflicting impulses toward 
withdrawal and involvement. He resisted the temptation to dismiss Whig argu-
ment with superficial rebuttals; he regarded the complexity of the pre-Revolu-
tionary debate with great seriousness; this polarity pitted his dismay against 
his intellect and curiosity. It enabled him to be at once withdrawn and self-
conscious and also capable of seeing himself in a larger context. When he 
became fully engaged in the task of understanding a tenet of Whig belief, 
Hutchinson brought to his work the full force of his highly controlled emotion-
ality. During the protracted dispute from 1769-1772, over the removal of the 
General Court from Boston, he tried to breathe life and vitality into the notion 
that the royal instructions to colonial governors were a positive benefit to the 
political life of the province. As he elaborated his explanation, the Crown's 
prerogative became an intimate, all-embracing, pervasive, organic influence 
which transmuted mobility and finesse to otherwise static executive authority. 
In turn the governor's receptiveness, discretion, and intelligence in responding 
to imperial directives determined their effectiveness. Hutchinson constructed 
an idealized minuet between Crown and governor which was almost poetic 
and sensuous in its structure and intricacy? Hutchinson, significantly con-
ceived of British power as a throbbing, expansive force which could permeate 
and activate his own behavior as governor. Colonial leaders conceived of 
British power in exactly the same fashion; as Professor Bailyn observes, they 
were transfixed by the "essential . . . aggressiveness" of political power and 
by its "endlessly propulsive tendency to expand itself beyond legitimate bound-
aries!'8 Confident that he could serve as a channel and instrument of British 
authority without damaging the liberty of his province, Hutchinson only suc-
ceeded in confirming his enemies' deepest fears about the capacity of the 
Crown to insinuate itself into the political life of the province. 
6 Hutchinson, Speeches of. . . Governor Hutchinson to the General Assembly . . . (Boston, 
1773), pp. 13-14; see also his "Dialogue between a European and an American [Englishman]," 
Hutchinson Papers, XXVIII, p. 102, Mass. Arch. 
7 Lord and Calhoon, "The Removal of the General Court',' pp. 747^8, 753-54. 
8 Bailyn, Ideological Origins, p. 56. 
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Hutchinson's insistence on principle and his calculated style of debate and 
exposition distinguished him from William Smith, Jr. and other moderate 
critics of colonial resistence who shunned dispute over principle and sought 
practical, improvised accommodation with Britain. In imperial-colonial dis-
putes, Smith complained in 1767, "both sides fly to the constitution for argu-
ments . . . diametrically opposite to each other . . . . The truth is, that the 
Empire, long after the Constitution was formed, acquired a new adventitious 
state, and the question therefore is, not what the Constitution is or was, but 
what present circumstances considered, it ought to be'.' The study of "present 
circumstances" convinced him that "the Constitution, be what it will, ought 
to bend" enough to accommodate the growing maturity and complexity of 
the Empire? Smith's conception of a constitution as a malleable instrument 
which men could shape to serve the public interest and his realization that the 
British and the colonists necessarily brought to this task different expectations 
and assumptions were original and almost prophetic insights. 
This ability as a constitutional theorist and diagnostician complimented a 
different set of Smith's predispositions during the pre-Revolutionary period: 
his fondness for the intricate strategies which his fellow councillors employed 
in competing for the ear and trust of successive royal governors, especially 
William Tryon who arrived in 1771. After one protracted struggle Smith be-
lieved he had won Tryon's confidence and made him suspicious of the rival 
Delancey faction. "I shall feed that spirit',' he exulted in a moment of revelation, 
"to disentangle him from a fear of Council and Assembly'.' During the Tea 
crisis in December 1773 he tried to use the same methods to guide Tryon's 
hand during a hazardous period. He beseiged Tryon with suggestions on how 
to avoid violence if the tea was landed or how to prevent its unloading if vio-
lence was unavoidable. The destruction of the tea in Boston took the decision 
out of Tryon's hands and launched a new period of greater crisis for royal 
officials. "It must mortify Tryon who had spoken so vauntingly and assured 
the government of the landing" of the tea, Smith noted with customary care. 
But he was much more aware that his own attempts to guide Tryon's hand had 
been of little practical value to the governor. "Tryon will think I animated him 
to render him unpopular',' he lamented; "how dangerous it is to give private 
advice'.'10 
Smith appeared in 1774-1775 simply to be a conservative gravitating to the 
right of his former allies in the Livingston faction; in reality he was wholly 
engrossed in working out the implications of his chosen roles as constitutional 
analyst and behind-the-scenes manipulator of government and party policy. 
9 Robert M. Calhoon, ed., "William Smith's Alternative to the American Revolution',' William 
and Mary Quarterly, third series, XXII (1965), pp. 105-118. 
10 W. H. W. Sabine, ed., Historical Memoirs from . . . 1763 to . . . 1776 of William Smith (New 
York, 1956), pp. 118, 156-164. 
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He wrote and circulated numerous essays on the constitutional and tactical 
problems facing colonial leaders and propounded an almost clinical set of 
negotiating tactics, which included "feeling the pulse of the ministry" pro-
ceeding "without a word about rights',' and exercising exquisite tact and timing. 
When all this came to naught he responded by writing his longest and most 
moving exposition of the issues of the Revolution, one which juxtaposed a 
scathing indictment of British policy and defense of colonial liberty with an 
absolute refusal to sanction armed rebellion. The conflict between the two 
commitments reduced him to an abject state of intellectual immobility long 
before his apparently opportunistic conversion to the British cause. "I per-
suade myself,' he told an inquisitive committee of safety on July 4, 1776, "that 
Great Britain will discern the propriety of negotiating for a pacification'.' He 
could not relinquish the hope that the elusive search for accommodation would 
transfix the lives of other men as completely as it had his own? 
The enunciation of principle often reflected a concern with law and the 
details of imperial administration while the search for accommodation ex-
pressed an awareness of the subtleties of colonial politics. In contrast, the 
appeal to doctrine came from men on the periphery of political life and im-
perial government. Eschewing legal and practical objections to colonial resist-
ance, they focussed directly on the immortality and ugliness of discontent. 
The high Anglican polemicists were, of course, the quintessential doctrinaire 
Loyalists and Bernard Bailyn has most effectively shown that their writings 
struck with jugular accuracy at the most significant tenets of Whig theory. 
In Samuel Seabury's vivid denunciation of violence and intimidation, Jonathan 
Boucher's taut authoritarian logic, and Thomas Bradbury Chandler's breath-
taking endorsement of subordination, Bailyn found "wrathful epitaphs" to an 
"ancient, honorable, moribund philosophy" of order and obedience? 
Seabury's fame as a polemicist rests on his colorful and pugnacious denunci-
ation of whig tactics for enforcing the Continental Association boycott on 
trade with Britain in late-1774 and early-1775. But his vivid language has dis-
tracted attention away from the systematic argument which formed the core 
of the Letters of a Westchester Farmer— the nature of perception itself. Sea-
bury was fascinated with the way in which the mind handles sense impressions 
and organizes them into concepts. He beseached his readers to practice enough 
sophistication to subject each new impression of rebellion to careful and crit-
ical scrutiny. Unless men assessed the future implications of their actions and 
appreciated the power and destructiveness of mass contagion, they could not 
prudently restrain their enthusiasms nor calm the passions of their fellow men. 
The root of the problem was the finite capacity of the mind and the limitless 
11 Ibid., pp. 224-228c, 271-277, 279. 
12 Bailyn, Ideological Origins, p. 312; a highly original but gingerly examination of high Tory 
ideology is Michael D. Clark, "Jonathan Boucher: The Mirror of Reaction',' Huntington Library 
Quarterly, XXXIII (1969), pp. 19-32. 
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appeal of false political ideas. "At present politics seems to engross almost 
every body',' he complained in 1769, "and leaves no room for more serious and 
important reflection'.' The result by 1774 was a "sullen, sulky obstinacy" which 
"takes possession of us Preposterous pride! . . . It degrades instead of 
exalting our characters" and was the product of "all the insidious arts that 
evilminded and designing men can possibly make use of.' Only by assuming a 
posture of aloof, watchful skepticism could a man avoid contamination from 
glib, appealing, but unsupportable patriot contentions. In the midst of a long 
series of obtuse propositions — one, for example, resurrected virtual repre-
sentation in terms which no politically knowledgeable Loyalist would have 
defended — Seabury abruptly related the discussion to his central concern. 
"That you will perceive the force of this reasoning',' he told his polemical rival, 
Alexander Hamilton, "I cannot pretend to say. A person . . . with jaundice 
sees no color but yellow. Party heat, the fever of liberty, may vitiate the mind 
as much as jaundice does the eyes'.'13 
Hutchinson, Smith, and Seabury only suggest the distinctiveness of the ideas, 
beliefs, sensibilities, and patterns of response exhibited by men who enunci-
ated principle, searched for accommodations, or appealed to doctrine during 
the pre-Revolutionary controversy. Although principle, accommodation, and 
doctrine were not mutually exclusive categories into which men can be placed, 
the leading prominent opponents of colonial resistance and the most widely 
circulated anti-whig ideas of the pre-Revolutionary period almost all adhere 
to one of these three modes of thought and feeling. Principle, accommodation, 
and doctrine were orientations and assumptions which gave direction and 
focus to men's thinking and conduct. In some cases individuals shared more 
than one of these orientations. John Wentworth of New Hampshire was pre-
eminently a man of accommodation with his warm association with the Rock-
ingham Whigs, thorough contempt for the policies and style of officials like 
Hillsborough, and primary concern for the interests of his province. He grace-
fully adapted to a substantial reduction in his family's power in New Hampshire 
during his governorship. He had a rare degree of serenity which enabled him 
— without a trace of ambivalence — to contemplate the use of military force 
to uphold British authority and accept without apparent bitterness his own 
exile from America. No other Loyalist embodied so fully as Wentworth a 
congenial attachment to both principle and accommodation!* 
In most cases, a man who partook of more than one of these orientations 
was dominated by one particular view of political reality and borrowed inci-
13 Seabury to Rev. Daniel Burton, 17 December 1769 and 29 March 1770, Society for the Propa-
gation of the Gospel Papers, Fulham Palace, London; ms. sermon, Lambeth Palace, London; 
Clarence Vance, ed., Letters of a Westchester Farmer (White Plains, New York, 1930), pp. 152, 
72-75,104,111-112,116. 
14 Wentworth to Dr. Belham, 9 August 1768, Wentworth Letterbooks, New Hampshire Depart-
ment of Records and Archives, Concord, New Hampshire, quoted extensively in L. S. Mayo, John 
Wentworth ... (Cambridge, 1921), pp. 122-124. 
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dentally from the others. Joseph Galloway desperately wanted to engineer 
single-handedly an imperial compromise in 1774. The structure of his ideas 
about the preservation of liberty and the scope of his ambition to heal the 
Empire in one brilliant stroke dictated that he pronounce rigid principles 
about the nature of the Empire and that he insist on the complete acquiescence 
of other colonial leaders to his leadership. When men did not listen to his 
explanations of principle and liberty and ignored his pretentions to leadership, 
they created an unexpectedly severe dilemma: they shattered his image of 
himself as a master of political theory and public persuasion. Galloway then 
replaced this shattered self-image with one still more magnificent and yet also 
consistent with his initial posture as an advocate of accommodation and enun-
ciator of principle: "I have deduced your rights and explained your duties. 
I have laid before you the constitutional extent of parliamentary jurisdiction. 
I have pointed to the mode which you ought to pursue for a restoration of 
those rights'.' His concept of role and the dilemma in which it placed him com-
pelled Galloway to locate all of the wisdom necessary to a solution of the 
imperial impasse in his own mind. At each stage his perception undermined 
his advocacy of accommodation and intensified his insistence on principle.15 
Orientations toward principle, accommodation, or doctrine not only over-
lapped, they also cut across without completely severing other intellectual 
alignments during the pre-Revolutionary controversy. Alan Heimert has asso-
ciated rationalist theology with loyalism or with lukewarm, insensitive support 
of the Whig movement!6 In direct conflict with the Calvinist Whigs, the 
rationalist clergy did not believe that British policy sprang from utter human 
depravity nor believe that confession and repentance was an integral pre-
liminary stage in the defense of American liberty. To the rationalist clergy 
sin afflicted the thoughtless and unreflective. In political terms the sins which 
needed confessing and forgiving in 1774-1775 were "turbulent desires, secret 
views of fostering party spirit, lust for unjust dominion, and impatience with 
lawful government'.'17 In elaboration of Heimert's thesis it must also be point-
ed out that rationalists were sub-divided into accommodating and doctrinaire 
Loyalist positions. The accommodating rationalists included Anglicans like 
William Smith and Jacob Duche and Congregationalists like Gad Hitchcock 
and Daniel Shute. They endorsed just enough remonstrance to bring colonial 
discontent to British attention but not so much as to exacerbate the conflict. 
The doctrinaire rationalist clergy led by Boucher, Chandler, Cooper, and 
Seabury eschewed this search for a moderate position: political opposition 
was not an instrument which men might employ responsibly; its "bitterness 
15 Robert M. Calhoon, '"I have deduced your rights': Joseph Galloway's Concept of his Role, 
1774-1775',' Pennsylvania History, XXV (1968), pp. 356-78. 
16 Alan Heimert, Religion and the American Mind: From the Great Awakening to the Revolu-
tion (Cambridge, Mass., 1966). 
17 William Smith, The Works of William Smith, D.D. (Philadelphia, 1803), II, p. 123. 
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and wrath and anger and clamour and evil speaking . . . bitter ungodly spirit 
toward those who differ . . . in things civil or religious" were intrinsically evil," 
explained the Rev. Samuel Andrews of Connecticut in 1775. The "confidence" 
and sense of "girding" for righteous conflict which he saw all around him — 
which the accommodating rationalists wanted to dignify, channel ,and moder-
ate — blinded men, in Andrews' view, to the truth that political change was 
the prerogative of God and not of men? 
Just as Andrews felt compelled to look squarely at the moral earnestness 
of his Whig contemporaries, most pre-Revolutionary Loyalists felt driven to 
discover and articulate a single quintessential insight into the causes of the 
Revolution and of their own plight. The reconstruction of their perception 
leads directly to each man's discovery of some central truth about himself 
and the Revolution. For Egerton Leigh, it came when he discovered that he 
could relate every step in South Carolina's political and constitutional develop-
ment to some stage in his own humiliation and downfall. Once he sensed that 
unity and coherence in South Carolina history, he could at the same time write 
a trenchant account of the province's political development and also establish 
his own identity by accentuating the very presumptions about himself which 
most outraged Charlestown's planter-merchant elite and made him a pariah!9 
Jonathan Sewall's withering contempt for the Whig protest in Massachusetts 
reflected a conflict he had felt throughout his adult life: tension between his 
intellectual distinction and courage on one hand and his insecurity about his 
social and political pre-eminence on the other. He developed an ironic, slightly 
cynical, and sometimes bemused dismay over any exuberant human enter-
prise. These defences protected him from the kind of volcanic eruptions of 
rage which racked his cohort, Peter Oliver, and enabled him to locate the 
source of disorder in Massachusetts, which "is, I say, so truly astonishing, so 
entirely out of the course of nature, so repugnant to the known principles 
which most forceably actuate the human mind that we must search deeper 
for the grand and hidden spring . . . . This is an enthusiasm in politics like 
that which religious notions inspire, that drives men on with an unnatural im-
petuosity [and] baffles and confounds all calculation grounded upon rational 
principles'.'20 
The Loyalist perception of the coming of the American Revolution con-
sisted of brilliantly incisive but partially formed and almost stillborn political 
fears, apprehensions, uncertainties, impulses toward obstruction, and sensa-
tions of ambivalence, immobility, and helplessness. This fragmentation and 
18 Samuel Andrews, A Discourse Shewing the Necessity of Joining Internal Repentance with 
the External Profession of It.. . (New Haven, 1775), pp. 15-18. 
19 Robert M. Calhoon and Robert M. Weir, " 'The Scandalous History of Sir Egerton Leith,' " 
William and Mary Quarterly, third series, XXVI (1969). pp. 47-74. 
20 Sewall to General Frederick Haldimand, 30 May 1775, quoted in Jack P. Greene, ed., Colonies 
to Nation, 1763-1776 (New York, 1967), pp. 266-268. 
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lack of coalescence in pre-Revolutionary Loyalist ideology testified to the 
fragility of elaborate political ideas in eighteenth-century America and the 
rapid mortality rate of particular formulations of thought as public men strug-
gled continually to revamp slightly out-of-date intellectual postures. In a polit-
ical culture which took ideas very seriously, this instability cast marginal polit-
ical figures like the critics and victims of pre-Revolutionary protest into an 
excrutiating position. This unstable, fluid political culture not only dominated 
the eighteenth century — as Jack P. Greene's two recent articles on colonial 
pessimism and anxiety dramatically emphasized — but elements of this malady 
continued well into the nineteenth century and provided much of the dis-
traught energy expended by James M. Banner's Federalists and Fred Somkin's 
Fourth of July orators.21 
With the commencement of hostilities in 1775 and the Declaration of In-
dependence in 1776, these discrete categories of conservatism and defense 
of the established order tended to dissolve. War and the creation of new state 
governments widened the scope of the conflict and caught thousands of pre-
viously obscure men in the machinery of internal security. The people that 
Professor Nelson calls "The Tory Rank and File" were clusters of "cultural 
minorities" scattered throughout the geographical and social periphery of 
American life: religious pacifists, pre-British Indian traders, backcountry 
southern farmers, unassimilated ethnic minorities, as well as isolated indivi-
duals everywhere impelled by custom, instinct, greed, accident, resentment, 
or bad luck to oppose independence.22 They expressed their opposition to 
the Revolution in more elemental ways than did their counterparts in the 
pre-Revolutionary controversy. As the War for Independence created Loyalist 
communities in occupied New York, Charlestown, and Philadelphia and as 
communities of exiles formed in England and Canada, a new sense of Loyalist 
identity emerged: the Loyalists' ironic discovery that they were victims of both 
American aggression and British incompetence. That understandable, if some-
what irrational paranoia, became a positive force in shaping post-Revolution-
ary Loyalist behavior. It engendered a tough, realistic, and implacable deter-
mination to surmount the difficulties of rebuilding their lives and constructing 
a new political and social order in British North America. The pre-Revolution-
ary Loyalist perception was only one ingredient in this long and fascinating 
process. But if this interpretation of the stages of Loyalist thought is a valid 
21 Jack P. Greene, "Search for Identity: An Interpretation of the Meaning of Selected Patterns 
of Social Response in Eighteenth-Century America',' Journal of Social History, III (1970), pp. 189-
220 and "Political Mimesis: A Consideration of the British Colonies in the Eighteenth-Century',' 
American Historical Review, LXXV (1969), pp. 337-367; James M. Banner, To the Hartford Con-
vention: The Federalists and the Origins of Party Politics in Massachusetts, 1789-1815 (New York, 
1970) and Fred Somkin, Unquiet Eagle: Memory and Desire in the Idea of American Freedom, 
1815-1860 (Ithaca, 1967). 
22 See W. H. Nelson, The American Tory (Oxford, 1961), chapter V. 
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preliminary diagnosis of the historical problem, then the riches of the Loyalist 
Papers Project may well fuel a far-reaching inquiry into the comparative in-
tellectual history of colonial America, Revolutionary America and England, 
and post-Revolutionary Canada? 
23 On these patterns see Wallace Brown, The Good Americans: The Loyalists in the American 
Revolution (New York, 1969), chapter 6; David V. J. Bell, "Nation and Non-Nation: A New Analy-
sis of the Loyalists and the American Revolution" (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Harvard Uni-
versity, 1969); and Mary Beth Norton, The British-Americans: The Loyalist Exiles in England, 
1774-1789 (Boston, 1972). 
